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It has also been held that “[b]ecause the Privacy Act provides its own remedy for an agency’s improper refusal to process a proper request for information, [a plaintiff] is not entitled to mandamus relief.” , No.
3, 2003) (per curiam) (affirming “district court’s dismissal of appellant’s constitutional claims based on the BOP’s alleged maintenance and use of inaccurate information because such claims are encompassed within the Privacy Act’s comprehensive remedial scheme”); , 301 F.3d 688, 696 (6th Cir.
May 13, 2004) (per curiam) (holding that plaintiff’s APA claim for expunction of records “lacked merit”; denying plaintiff’s Privacy Act claim for expunction or amendment of records as the agency had exempted “the relevant system of records from the access, amendment, and civil penalty provisions of the Act,” and plaintiff failed to “request expunction or amendment at the agency level prior to filing suit”); , No.
11, 2013) (finding that “[p]laintiff does not provide any authority that demonstrates that he is required to make a greater showing in order to achieve relief under the Privacy Act or that adequate relief is not available under that Act[,]”where plaintiff attempted to challenge an agency’s finding of his ineligibility to work under both the Privacy Act and the APA); , 842 F.
25, 2002) (holding that court had jurisdiction under APA to enjoin FBI from disclosing investigative records in order to prevent future violation of subsection (b) of Privacy Act); , 893 F.2d 370, 374 n.6 (D.
1990) (stating in dicta that “[i]t is not at all clear to us that Congress intended to preclude broad equitable relief (injunctions) to prevent (e)(7) violations .
10, 1999) (holding Privacy Act notice requirements inapplicable to issuance of IRS summons, as 26 U.
§ 7852(e) “plainly states that the provisions of the Privacy Act do not apply, directly or indirectly, to assessing the possibility of a tax liability”); , No. [T]here is nothing in the statute itself, nor in any judicial authority, which suggests that its violation may provide any form of relief in a federal criminal prosecution.”), nor is failure to comply with the Privacy Act a proper defense to summons enforcement, , No. 17, 2010) (“[T]he IRS is not required to comply with section 552a(e)(3) as a prerequisite to issuing or enforcing a summons. Additionally, the Privacy Act does not contain any provision allowing the quashing of an IRS summons as a remedy for any alleged failure to provide information as required by that Act.”); , 43 F. 1999) (rejecting argument to quash summons on (e)(3) grounds because requirements of subsection (e)(3) “are not applicable to summons issued pursuant to 26 U. § 552a(g), two of which provide for injunctive relief – amendment lawsuits under (g)(1)(A) and access lawsuits under (g)(1)(B) – and two of which provide for compensatory relief in the form of monetary damages – damages lawsuits under (g)(1)(C) and (g)(1)(D).